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Problem, research strategy, and
findings: The contentious politics of the
demolition of Lafitte public housing in postKatrina New Orleans and its replacement
with mixed-income properties is a telling
case of the strategic conflicts housing
advocates face in public housing revitalization. It reveals how the qualified outcomes
of HOPE VI interact with local institutional
and historical circumstances to confound
the equity and social justice goals of housing
and community development advocates. It
shows the limits to public housing revitalization as an urban recovery strategy when
hostile government leadership characterizes
a region, and the state is recast as an adversary rather than revitalization partner. This
case is part of a longer ethnographic project
on post-Katrina New Orleans recovery.
Takeaway for practice: Housing and
community development advocacy for
urban revitalization strategies is limited
without a supportive state partner to
endorse and smooth programmatic efforts.
Public housing revitalization, especially the
legacy and derivatives of HOPE VI, is
imbued with multiple, often conflicting
meanings and expectations across its range
of stakeholders. Nonprofit housing advocates charged with integrating revitalization
schemes in communities with historic
government-civil society conflict can expect
resistance and challenges from both the state
and civil society actors.
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I

n December 2007, as protesters clashed with police outside City Hall, the
New Orleans City Council voted to move forward with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) proposed demolition
of the Big Four public housing projects, Lafitte, C. J. Peete, B. W. Cooper, and
St. Bernard, and their replacement with mixed-income developments. Public
housing in New Orleans would be reduced by 70% (Browne-Dianis & Sinha,
2008) as part of a broader privatization effort targeting public schools, hospitals, and housing pushed by the federal government after Hurricane Katrina.
Local and national resistance to HUD’s plan, announced in June 2006 following the August 2005 hurricane and delayed in part by a class action lawsuit
from former tenants, had been immediate, sustained, and multifaceted. Direct
action housing activists in New Orleans staged tent cities in protest; nonprofit
legislative advocacy coalitions championed federal legislation that would
require evidence-based plans for phased redevelopment and one-for-one
replacement with physical units or housing vouchers. Yet, the tenant plaintiffs
lost, federal legislation stalled in committee, and HUD’s insistence on deconcentrating the pre-hurricane poverty of New Orleans prevailed in the face of
severe affordable housing and labor shortages and widespread residential
displacement.
In the transformation of New Orleans public housing, nonprofit organizations across the urban policy spectrum have been directly involved in the
debates and efforts to preserve, defend, demolish, and rebuild these former
public housing sites. The contentious politics surrounding the redevelopment
of the Lafitte projects in the historic, African American, central city neighborhood of Tremé, a telling case of the strategic conflicts housing advocates face
in public housing transformation, is the focus of this analysis (see the map in
the Appendix). The key actors in this study are national and local community
development practitioners and their social justice, social service, policy advocacy, labor, academic, and community organizing counterparts who work on
the long-term recovery of devastated low-income neighborhoods in New
Orleans.
This case reveals how the qualified outcomes of the HOPE VI program
and specific institutional and historical circumstances of New Orleans collided
in the post-Katrina moment to confound strategic opportunities for these
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nonprofit organizations. Broader conflicts over mixedincome housing and the transformation of the nation’s
public housing stock unfolded in a post-disaster region
characterized by hostile government leadership and robust
and punitive policies of privatization.
Post-Katrina New Orleans presented an historic moment in which housing, development, and social justice
advocates felt they had to step in and direct an original
American city’s recovery in the face of willful federal indifference to its survival. Powerful and energized organizational leaders entered New Orleans with pledges and
resources to support unprecedented resident organizing
and community control of recovery and rebuilding. Yet,
instead, an antagonistic federal state intent on privatization
as a recovery strategy forced these nonprofits back into
familiar, well-worn urban development territory: siloed
revitalization efforts narrowly framed around site development. What has emerged as a model public housing revitalization project, Faubourg Lafitte, began as a muchmaligned concession prize for a recovery network of
organizations committed to a new, transcendent model of
urban equitable development.
This analysis is part of a growing body of research
interrogating the role of the nonprofit sector in the recovery
of New Orleans (see, e.g., Arena, 2012; BondGraham,
2011; Graham, 2010, 2012; Sinha, 2009). This contribution centers the perspective of the nonprofits working in the
community development field and examines the limitations
to their practice when the state is the adversary rather than
the partner. This is a particularly important inquiry when
evaluating the evolving role of public housing in the United
States as an affordable housing option for low-income
urban communities. Public-private partnerships are at the
core of HOPE VI. What strategic options exist for housing
and community development nonprofits when the state has
abdicated its responsibilities to low-income communities, as
was the charge in post-Katrina New Orleans, and civil
society is forced to pick up the pieces in its absence?

Data and Methods
This analysis is part of a larger ethnographic project in
post-Katrina New Orleans from 2005 to 2009 (see especially Graham, 2010, 2012). I was a participant-observer as
a consultant and scholar in a loosely affiliated network of
organizations seeking to build a recovery coalition to rebuild the city’s poorest neighborhoods and bring displaced
low-income New Orleanians home. I worked with just over
60 practitioners, activists, consultants, and philanthropists
representing 28 different organizations focusing on New
Orleans’s recovery, specifically the redevelopment of low-
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income, African American neighborhoods and the repatriation of displaced residents. Entities ranged from grassroots,
informal (i.e., no 501(c)(3) status) emergency action
groups, to the major labor unions, with philanthropy,
organizing, and development organizations most common.
For descriptive purposes, as proxy for insider-outsider
dynamics and the potential power differentials associated
with organization size and proximity to centers of power
(e.g., Washington, DC),1 organizational headquarters and
2006 assets are briefly summarized here. These 28 organizations were almost evenly split between the New Orleans
region and the Northeast.2 Fifteen were based in or around
New Orleans. Non-local organizations were on average
larger than local entities. Using 2006 net assets as an
approximation of organizational resources, the median
asset base for a New Orleans organization was $6.9 million, compared with $37 million for Northeast organizations.3
In this analysis, a smaller cohort of organizations plays
a central role and their actions are described in detail here.
Given that their recovery work is public knowledge, organizational names are unchanged. However, when quoting
different actors, I removed organizational affiliations and
most identity markers to protect anonymity.

Committing to the “Right to Return”
of Displaced New Orleanians
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the leadership
of a range of national nonprofit community development
entities, labor unions, policy organizations, and their urban
planning and development colleagues in academia began
discussing a coordinated response to Hurricane Katrina.
Many of these executives led entities with subsidiary 501(c)
(3)s in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast that they now
were trying to assist, or had been contacted by New
Orleans groups or the Louisiana government to provide
recovery technical assistance.4
These conversations built on leaders’ long-standing
personal and professional relationships. Although these
organizations ranged from community development corporations (CDCs) to foundations to civil rights legal teams,
their interorganizational and interpersonal relationships
constitute a loosely cohered recovery network.5 This network developed what social movement scholars call a shared
injustice frame (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992;
Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001), articulating a demonstrative move by the federal government toward urban privatization and permanent displacement of the urban poor from
New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina’s cause and consequences,
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that is, the willful federal government indifference to and
neglect of a unique American city and its most vulnerable
residents, the majority of them Black and poor, leading to
their possible permanent displacement and exclusion from
recovery processes, was the source of moral outrage for these
organizational actors. This extended toward a shared diagnosis that fulfilling the right to return of the displaced
should be their primary objective. Indeed, the “‘right of
return’ of displaced New Orleanians was a claim used by a
broad range of recovery actors” (Graham, 2012, p. 6); it
became “the motto of the reconstruction movement, used
widely within and beyond movement circles” (Luft, 2009,
p. 516). HUD even incorporated it in its post-Katrina
redevelopment plans.
Organizational leaders saw their collective response as
nothing short of a social movement, grounded in a mutual
desire to reignite their shared activist histories in Black social
movements and workers’ and immigrants’ rights campaigns.
One executive from a national community development
intermediary characterized New Orleans as the site of “the
next Civil Rights movement” (personal communication,
February 20, 2006). A consultant retained by an international relief organization to advise on funding grassroots
recovery and organizing viewed Katrina as “an opportunity
to organize a strong movement in the South” (personal
communication, October 25, 2005). A radical left activist in
New Orleans saw reconstruction as only occurring equitably
through a “real, popular, pro-working class, anti-racist…
movement developing our own plans, making demands and
struggling to implement them” (personal communication,
November 6, 2005). A local grassroots coalition, the People’s
Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee (PHRF),
saw “movement mobilization nationwide” backing unioncommunity partnerships envisioning “what kind of society
we want” as a key ingredient in an equitable recovery response (People’s Hurricane Relief Fund & Oversight Committee, personal communications, September 29, 2005 and
October 10, 2005). Many scholars and activists called for a
renewed social movement in the aftermath of Katrina
(Dawson, 2006; Dreier, 2006a, 2006b; Giroux, 2006; Luft,
2009; Muhammad, 2006; Sanyika, 2009). These organizational leaders, including women and men, African American, White, Asian American, based in New Orleans and
nationwide, believed they could heed this call.

Building a Recovery Coalition in
Post-Katrina New Orleans
Institutional missions, expertise, cultures, and histories
shaped the specific strategies national and local organiza-
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tions aimed to employ in post-Katrina New Orleans. Yet, a
broadly defined, multifaceted goal united organizations
and encouraged their collaboration: to empower the voices
of low-income, African American New Orleanians most
likely to be displaced and left out of post-disaster recovery
processes, and to rebuild their communities in a more
equitable, more inclusive, more participatory way. Organizational leaders envisioned sustainable citizen political and
economic empowerment, by organizing residents to participate in recovery planning processes as well as in the
physical rebuilding process through job training, job
placement, and ownership investments in community
assets. Citizen empowerment would necessarily follow
from carefully designed planning and rebuilding processes
that provided good jobs, high wages, asset building, and
citizen decision making and control over their communities’ recovery. The potential organizational resources available to this endeavor included philanthropic funds, labor
union pension funds, union organizing and construction
skills, union apprenticeship programs, community development finance and housing production expertise, policy
expertise and legislative access, and grassroots ties to New
Orleans neighborhoods that centered Black political power
and leadership and built on communities’ cultural assets
and histories.
A major rationale for coalition building was to overcome the fractious ethno-racial, class, and neighborhood
politics among community-based groups in New Orleans
and instead project one loud, demonstrative, and powerful
voice speaking for the displaced poor (Thompson, 2009).
Representatives from national and local organizations
envisioned exerting political power to become a major
actor in rebuilding on behalf of low-income communities
of color (personal communication, n.d.).6 At one coalitionbuilding effort in Washington, DC, in the fall of 2005,
labor unions, progressive funders, social movement organizations, planning faculty, and grassroots groups debated
whether they could find a demonstration block to test
organizing-driven physical redevelopment and meet workforce development objectives (personal communication,
November 11, 2005).

Defending Tremé
Coalition building was driven in part by an abstract
fear of rampant speculation, land grabs, and backroom
deals to buy up property in New Orleans that would lead
to gentrification and permanent displacement (personal
communication, February 20, 2006). The entire footprint
of New Orleans seemed up for grabs, considering the
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financial and leadership bankruptcy of the city encouraged
a recovery strategy of “rebuild at your own risk” (Gelinas,
2008) that was particularly welcoming to private-sector
development. Explained one African American community
activist and lawyer during a visit from one of the national
unions, organizers had a responsibility to orient themselves
and others to “get beyond that every group wants to claim”
the city and to focus on developing New Orleans “the way
it could look,” because people did not want to come home
to what it looked like after Katrina (personal communication, February 20, 2006).
These fears, as well as the desire to have a “stake in the
ground” (personal communication, n.d.) around which
resident-led reconstruction would unfold, privileged land
acquisition as a strategy within the coalition. Moderately
damaged and geographically central low-income African
American neighborhoods seemed particularly at risk for
speculation and gentrification. Their proximity to downtown, moderate hurricane damage, and position on the
higher ground of the city also made them desirable sites for
resident-led, equitable development strategies. Tremé stood
out as the site for a demonstration or model initiative,
following the recommendation in November 2005 of a
local CDC leader advising national organizations about
their entrée to New Orleans (personal communication,
n.d.). From an initial site visit in New Orleans, one planning colleague wrote:
Tremé has access to a large number of services, abuts
the French Quarter, and is facing severe pressure for
gentrification. It is bisected by a freeway entrance that
separates what is now called Back of Town from the
section currently known as Tremé though both are
historically part of the area. The back of town area had
a great deal of potential for targeted redevelopment.
Really nice architecture, significant flood damage,
strong historical presence (birthplace of jazz), etc. This
is an area that could be well served as a model and will
be almost immediately reknit into the city’s fabric. If
we can figure out how to do something there, it could
then be transferred to some of the other neighborhoods that are not as well connected, like the lower
9th…All in all, from a real estate perspective, the
Central City and the Tremé make a great deal of sense
as focused areas for redevelopment. (personal communication, November 3, 2005)
Tremé is one of the most historic Black neighborhoods
in the United States, home to the first free people of color
in the United States. It is home to the largest Black
Catholic congregation in the United States and is the
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historic heart of the Creole community in New Orleans. It
was also cut in half by highway construction (I-10) in the
era of Urban Renewal, losing its vibrant Black business
corridor and suffering from economic and urban decline in
the decades that followed. Given its historical significance,
relative damage, and geographic location, the opportunity
to redevelop Tremé in partnership with residents seemed
highly symbolic and important to national and local organizations as the recovery process unfolded. Tremé was “the
community to organize,” explained one national community development leader, as the “easiest quick win” and as a
priority neighborhood in the plan put forth by Mayor Ray
Nagin’s recovery planning body, the Bring New Orleans
Back (BNOB) Commission (personal communication,
February 20, 2006; March 7, 2006).
As the months passed and strategic planning and coalition building continued, the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and
the national community development intermediary Enterprise Community Partners were both moving forward in
their efforts to make a long-term and deep commitment to
New Orleans. Enterprise had partnered with the New
Orleans-based Catholic Charities, the largest social service
provider in the region that was rebounding rapidly in the
face of tremendous need. The AFL-CIO and Enterprise and
Catholic Charities both hoped to build in New Orleans new
organizational and housing production capacity, new affordable housing, and a stronger, more empowered workforce
and neighborhoods. For Enterprise and Catholic Charities,
“no net loss of affordable housing” (personal communication, n.d.) in rebuilding was a professional and moral imperative. Enterprise and Catholic Charities together
launched Providence Community Housing, a citywide
nonprofit community development corporation to carry out
housing redevelopment activities. The AFL-CIO planned to
incorporate community-based organizations into a proposed
billion-dollar economic development initiative.

To Raze or Re-Open Lafitte?
When Katrina struck, the Housing Authority of New
Orleans (HANO) was under federal receivership, making
HUD the primary local agency responsible for public
housing in the city. Since Katrina, local and national
groups had watched HUD’s actions and inactions around
public housing carefully and with growing anger. Rumors
abounded about HUD’s plans for the city’s public housing,
especially at the four sites the agency boarded up and
fenced off in December 2005, including the Lafitte
development in Tremé (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Lafitte development, December 2007, Tremé, New Orleans.
Source: Karen Apricot, by permission.
(Color figure available online.)

HUD’s decision to seal off select projects was described by one CDC leader in New Orleans as “criminal”
and “effectively preventing any public housing resident
from returning to NOLA.” This person hoped that “there
is a group of lawyers who are taking this issue on”
(personal communication, December 7, 2005). (At the
time, attorneys from the Loyola Law Clinic were fielding
calls from displaced tenants about if and when they would
be able to come home.) Similarly, following a housing
subcommittee meeting of the BNOB Commission in early
November, a colleague reported that “there was an interesting discussion that centered on people [angered] by the
notion that mixed-income neighborhoods were intended
to replace poor neighborhoods, and that poor people were
not going to get the same proportion of units in the rebuilt New Orleans as they had pre-Katrina” (personal
communication, November 4, 2005). Some organizations
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in this recovery coalition believed that HUD would pursue
rehabilitation or modest redevelopment to public housing,
including Lafitte, and that private-sector partners for
planning, redevelopment, and organizing would be needed
and welcome. But, for the most part, in the post-disaster
climate of a reticent and impassive federal state, with
asymmetries of information and innuendo and confusion,
most private-sector organizations were trying to devise
recovery strategies based on little or unconfirmed
information.
Summer 2006 saw a series of high-profile announcements and plans that effectively signed off recovery control
for Tremé/Lafitte to a national–local coalition of nonprofits. Over a series of meetings unfolding in the spring of
2006, the AFL-CIO, Enterprise, Providence, MIT urban
planning faculty and students, Tulane architecture faculty,
Ujamaa CDC in Tremé, and other organizations had
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developed a cohesive vision for a coalition-led neighborhood redevelopment process in Tremé that integrated
resident organizing, community planning, and the acquisition of blighted and adjudicated properties (Brown, 2006).
During this strategic planning phase, it was still unclear
what might happen to Lafitte.
Two major initiatives were disclosed on June 14, 2006.
The AFL-CIO announced a $1 billion “housing and economic development” commitment to New Orleans, its Gulf
Coast Revitalization Program, “…the first major infusion of
private capital into the Gulf Coast since [the 2005] hurricanes. In the absence of meaningful help from the federal
government, the AFL-CIO project is expected to open the
door for other substantial investments in rebuilding the area”
(Parks, 2006). The program launched in Tremé with a
proposed partnership with the newly formed Providence
Community Housing, MIT, and others to redevelop 196
adjudicated and blighted properties there. On that same day,
HUD announced its plans to “use a mix of federal public
housing funding HANO receives annually, as well as bond
funds and Low Income Housing Tax Credits to redevelop
C.J. Peete, B.W. Cooper, Lafitte and St. Bernard, which
endured moderate to severe damage. The units will be
demolished to make way for a mixture of public housing,
affordable rental housing and single-family homes” (White,
2006). The 896 units in Lafitte would face the wrecking
ball, to be replaced by mixed-income properties. Combined
with the almost 200 properties the AFL-CIO and Providence proposed to redevelop, the residential built environment of Tremé/Lafitte would be substantially transformed.
Two weeks later, The Advancement Project, a national
civil rights advocacy organization, and a team of local
attorneys, including those at Loyola Law Clinic who had
been previously organizing displaced tenants, filed a class
action lawsuit against HUD and HANO on behalf of
public housing tenants, citing U.S. housing policy, constitutional rights, and international human rights law as
grounds for residents’ right to return to their homes and
the right to participate in recovery efforts (Anderson v.
Jackson, 2006). Six weeks later, in early August 2006, the
AFL-CIO and Providence-led organizational team was
awarded the 196 adjudicated and blighted properties for
redevelopment in Tremé and the Tulane/Gravier neighborhood. Shortly before the first anniversary of Hurricane
Katrina, in late August, Enterprise Community Partners
and Providence Community Housing (hereafter Providence/Enterprise, per their materials) were revealed as the
nonprofit redevelopment team to transform Lafitte. Providence/Enterprise, despite HUD’s wishes, committed to
one-for-one replacement that would ensure one physical
unit built for each one that was demolished.
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Fulfilling the Right to Return
for Lafitte Tenants
The responses to HUD’s demolition plans by The
Advancement Project and its civil rights colleagues versus
Providence/Enterprise reflected competing approaches to
fulfilling displaced tenants’ right to return to New Orleans.
Both strategies began from the perspective that the state
was willfully discriminating against low-income Black New
Orleanians by refusing to reopen structurally sound, moderately damaged, public housing.7 Both approaches built
on the belief that civil society organizations must step in to
repatriate displaced New Orleanians and help them rebuild
their lives, in effect acting as a “quasi-government” (personal communication, n.d.) since the Bush Administration
had demonstrably abdicated its responsibilities to the most
vulnerable Katrina survivors.
These convictions and associated strategic actions have
multiple foundations, for the legal team, the U.S. Fair
Housing Act, the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, international
law, and the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution all mandate HUD and HANO repair and reopen
public housing so that “internally displaced” tenants may
come home and “rebuild their lives” (Anderson v. Jackson,
2006). HUD and HANO’s intent to demolish and shrink
the public housing stock was discriminatory, in violation of
tenants’ right to equal protection under the Constitution,
and in violation of the state’s responsibility to rehouse
“internally displaced persons” under international law
(Anderson v. Jackson, 2006). For the nonprofit housing
development team, contracting with HUD to redevelop
Lafitte was the most pragmatic way to ensure that the most
residents had the right to return in the foreseeable future,
in part by making an irreducible commitment to one-forone unit replacement and resident participation.
To these developers skilled in mixed-income redevelopment, affordable housing production, and community
development finance, the right of return was “empty rhetoric” without available physical units, and affordable housing
would be the pragmatic, just, and ultimately empowering
means for fulfilling this right (personal communication,
n.d.). Indeed, Providence/Enterprise made clear in their
press materials that they were not involved in HUD and
HANO’s “decision to demolish Lafitte,” but that they “got
involved to ensure that residents have a voice in the rebuilding of their community” (“Providence/Enterprise Plan,”
2008). Tenants now had absolute opportunity to return to
Tremé and New Orleans, if desired (“Providence/Enterprise
Partnership,” n.d.). In conjunction with the adjudicated
properties awarded for redevelopment, the Lafitte contract
gave Providence and its partners substantial control over the
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housing stock in Tremé/Lafitte, whose redevelopment this
coalition viewed as the best path toward the “equitable,
affordable and sustainable” community that would now
flourish in post-Katrina Tremé (“Providence/Enterprise
Plan,” 2008).
Despite the shared injustice frame initially held by this
recovery network, these competing strategies of legal action
versus redevelopment opened up deep rifts among these
loosely cohered organizations. The legal team and the
nonprofit developers both asserted that they were honoring
residents’ desires and intent. Challenging HUD and
HANO in court reflected the justifiable mistrust of local
public housing residents that the housing agencies had
their best interests in mind, a distrust steeped in the tortured history of the 1996 HOPE VI redevelopment of St.
Thomas public housing into River Garden, a mixed-income site. “Using federal HOPE VI funds and private
money, the St. Thomas project [had] been redeveloped as
River Garden, a physically attractive New Urbanist, mixedincome neighborhood in which, controversially, fewer than
one in five former public housing households [were able]
to return” (Graham, 2009). An African American social
justice activist in New Orleans explained that St. Thomas:
…was a very historic neighborhood and one of the
hearts of the Black Indian and Second Line Traditions.
It was a very traumatic experience when it was torn
down and the people forced out. The area was also the
site of many community protest [sic] for rights, against
the police and the city government. When they moved
people into the St. Bernard housing project, it started a
wave of violence in that neighborhood, because the St.
Thomas was an uptown project now being placed in
the St. Bernard, a downtown project also part of the
7th ward which doesn’t mix with the St. Thomas or
the 10th ward in which it was located. (personal
communication, November 7, 2005)
Critically, the community development sector was
implicated in the St. Thomas redevelopment; a local CDC
leader explained that a powerful private-sector developer in
the city, Joseph Canizaro
owned all the land around the St. Thomas Housing
project (large Hope VI) and he started a CDC that
could bring all the important community interests to
the table. He used this convening as a vehicle to buy
off important community figures. Then he pushed
through the development and dropped funding from
the nonprofit. (personal communication, November 3,
2005)
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Canizaro now co-chaired Nagin’s BNOB Commission, the
recovery committee responsible for the Urban Land Institute’s infamous green dot plan interpreted by New Orleanians as returning certain neighborhoods to nature (Olshansky
& Johnson, 2010). Canizaro was a major developer in the
city and a friend of and major donor to President Bush and
described by a local, African American community development leader as “the most dangerous person in the city”
(personal communication, November 3, 2005).
In New Orleans, because of the trauma and injustice
associated with the St. Thomas redevelopment, federal
policies of income mixing and poverty deconcentration
were viewed with outright hostility by many local activists
and residents. This “traditional urban planning idea,” one
local social justice activist explained, disrespected the “cultural identity of [New Orleanians] as attached to neighborhoods and land base” (peronal communication, September
15, 2005.). He warned against the growing enthusiasm of
the state, academics, and policymakers for reinvigorating
the deconcentration paradigm in New Orleans:8
...it goes without saying that [in New Orleans] you will
live forever, in the neighborhood you grew up in and
your parents grew up in. 7th ward for life. There is no
consideration of leaving the neighborhood to live in
another part of town. That in itself is traumatic when
it does happen as we recently saw [with] the ST. [sic]
Thomas…Violence escalated, as the communal identities clashed, and people never really integrated into the
downtown community…so the mixed income idea is
awash if people can’t return to their communal space.
(personal communication, September 15, 2005)
This Nagin-Canizaro-Bush connection and its relationship to past and future public housing outcomes in
New Orleans epitomized the political and institutional
networks that residents and community groups had long
distrusted. New Orleans community organizations struggled to overcome histories of racial, cultural, and neighborhood-based conflicts with one another in competition for
scarce resources. They struggled to work in good faith with
outsiders and were particularly suspicious of institutional
power. Systemic poverty and inequality in New Orleans
over hundreds of years—from slavery, from Jim Crow,
from public housing and urban renewal and HOPE VI,
from patterns of development that shunted African Americans disproportionately to low-lying, vulnerable neighborhoods, from prior government malfeasance against African
Americans in the face of floods (e.g., Barry, 1998) —led to
a deeply ingrained, widely held suspicion in New Orleans
of government, “experts,” and their resources.
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Both the City of New Orleans and the State of
Louisiana had long been riddled with government corruption, adding to the degree of distrust. As Lowe (2006)
writes, civil society organizations had to flourish “in spite
of the political situation” in New Orleans (p.73). In the
aftermath of one of the worst natural disasters in the
United States, where accusations of shocking, degrading,
and mortal ineptitude by the Bush Administration were
widespread (Alter, 2005; Kurtz, 2005; Polman, 2005;
Sullivan, 2005; Thomas, 2005), HUD and HANO’s
move to undertake the “largest demolition in the city’s
history” (Browne-Dianis & Sinha, 2008) in the face of
ongoing displacement, affordable housing scarcity, and
labor shortages was both unbelievable and of a piece of
the state’s response to Katrina. For vulnerable, displaced
public housing tenants, legal action seemed the only and
the most just recourse to get home to New Orleans.
That Providence/Enterprise had the support of the
“City of New Orleans Office of Recovery Management and
Office of the Mayor, Louisiana Housing Finance Agency,
State of Louisiana Office of Community Development,
Louisiana Recovery Authority, and many neighborhood
groups and collaborators” could only serve to alienate the
residents and their organizational allies who believed that
these state entities acted in mainly discriminatory and
violent ways toward low-income Black New Orleanians
(“Providence/Enterprise Plan,” 2008). Yet, Providence/
Enterprise, in a rigorously documented public effort, had
made contact with 650 former Lafitte households by 2008,
working with them on site planning, providing social
services, and hearing residents’ intent to return or move on
with their lives elsewhere (“Providence/Enterprise Plan,”
2008).
Project documents asserted the partnership’s “unsurpassed local credibility,” given Catholic Charities’ presence
in New Orleans since 1727, and the “technical expertise
and access to financial resources necessary to carry out
planning and redevelopment of this magnitude in a
timely, efficient and equitable manner” (“Providence/
Enterprise Partnership,” n.d.). This position did not
dispute local characterizations of HUD and HANO as
willfully harmful toward former tenants, especially evident
in the nonprofits’ care to distance themselves from the
“decision to demolish Lafitte” (“Providence/Enterprise
Plan,” 2008) but it, nonetheless, positioned the development partnership as best equipped to honor residents’
right to return through its centuries-long roots in New
Orleans providing affordable housing and social services
and unparalleled housing and finance expertise, including
in similar HOPE VI projects around the United States.9
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Lafitte as Referendum on HOPE VI
The conflicting strategies of The Advancement Project
legal team and the Providence/Enterprise redevelopment
partnership are nested in larger debates over public housing
policy in the United States, particularly the transformation
of public housing via the federal HOPE VI program of the
last two decades. Graham (2012) details the conflict among
housing and community development practitioners over
public housing demolition and the construction of mixedincome projects, and the broader debates within the field
over the deconcentration thesis. One of the primary concerns with HOPE VI public housing revitalization, as it is
known, is the net loss of original tenants from the rebuilt
sites. Popkin, Levy, and Buron (2009) find that 60–70% of
tenants never return to former sites, and a portion of
residents disappear from housing authorities’ rolls entirely.
HOPE VI has also spurred an unfortunate following by
municipalities around the country, who are pursuing
public housing demolition with minimal consideration for
the services and counseling encouraged in the HOPE VI
model.
Yet, support from policymakers, academics, and housing developers for mixed-income communities persists, due
to enduring beliefs that it is a mutual strategy of poverty
alleviation and urban development (Joseph, Chaskin, &
Webber, 2007), despite HOPE VI’s qualified success. In
their review of the oft-cited theoretical bases for mixedincome housing, Joseph et al. (2007) conclude:
…there is a compelling rationale for mixed-income
development that has nothing to do with lifting families out of poverty and is simply based on enabling the
private development of valuable inner city real estate.
Assuming for the moment that there are a significant
number of mixed-income developers for whom poverty alleviation is a goal, more clarity is needed about
which pathways of change those developers and their
partners intend to promote…given the multiplicity of
partners involved in any single, mixed-income development effort—private and nonprofit developers,
public agencies, social service providers, community
partners, lenders—there are likely to be a multiplicity
of expectations, in some cases contradictory. (2007,
p. 397)
This “multiplicity of expectations” was evident in
post-Katrina New Orleans, as some housing and civil rights
activists came to view their former nonprofit and planning
allies as “at best, disingenuous” (Sinha, 2009) in their
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advocacy and at worst, actively working against Lafitte
residents to “take away their homes and prolong their exile”
(Graham, 2006b). The often contradictory outcomes of
public housing revitalization, that is, the disturbing rates of
displacement and permanent loss of deeply affordable units
versus upgraded housing stock and the potential stimulation of economic development, meant that in an already
contentious and vulnerable environment like New Orleans,
with legitimate distrust of state-sponsored programs and
the experts and nonprofits who deliver them, the ability to
reach agreement on how best to preserve community assets
and fulfill the right to return was ill fated.
HUD’s aggressive and myopic insistence on public
housing demolition is central to this coalition’s collapse
and to the unusual degree of attention paid and resistance
to the future of the Big Four. For organizations within this
recovery network, the fate of New Orleans public housing
was an equity and racial justice issue. HUD and HANO
had housed about 5,100 families in public housing prior to
Katrina (Filosa, 2006).10 These displaced tenants, along
with other renters, were significantly underrepresented in
the city’s and state’s recovery plans despite disproportionate
damage to the city’s rental housing stock (Clark & Rose,
2007) and the pre-Katrina reality that 57% of residents
were renters.11
Furthermore, former public housing tenants in New
Orleans epitomized the undesirable residents elites wanted
to see permanently cast out of the new New Orleans that
would rise from Katrina’s waste. As Baton Rouge area GOP
Congressman Richard Baker exulted to the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, “We finally cleaned up public housing in
New Orleans…We couldn’t do it, but God did” (Hirsch &
Levert, 2009, p. 212). HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson
declared New Orleans unlikely “to be as Black as it was for
a long time, if ever again” and that “[o]nly the best [public
housing] residents should return,” i.e., those with jobs who
paid their rent on time (Anderson v. Jackson, 2006). Powell
(2007) recounts
One of Nagin’s closest advisers and richest contributors, James Reiss, said as much in an unguarded comment to the Wall Street Journal a few weeks following
Katrina: “Those who want to see this city rebuilt want
to see it done in a completely different way: demographically, geographically and politically…I’m not
just speaking for myself here. The way we’ve been
living is not going to happen again or we’re out.”
(p. 865)
Public housing in New Orleans is architecturally,
culturally, and historically significant (MacCash, 2011;
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Ouroussoff, 2007). The city was home to some of the
earliest projects in the nation, and amid the city’s intense
resident and economic segregation, public housing projects
were highly visible and symbolic tight-knit physical and
social communities within a city organized entirely around
dense, close kin and neighborhood networks. The physical
structures took on outsized meaning in the recovery process and in HUD’s demolition plans, imbued by the people
and networks that lived in them over generations. Kingsley
(2007) writes, “Buildings and their neighborhoods were
the settings where New Orleanians defined their identity,
developed their customs and rituals, and understood their
sense of place. After Katrina disrupted those histories and
memories, people looked to their buildings and neighborhoods even more desperately” (p. 719). I witnessed this
attachment at a planning meeting in Tremé, where people
spoke about the Lafitte buildings as if the structures themselves were their neighbors.
As organizations attempted to cohere around a shared
recovery strategy, the lack of a supportive state apparatus to
smooth their efforts not only complicated implementing
this vision, but also centered on HUD as the primary
challenger to empowering residents and their expert organizational allies to rebuild their communities. Given HUD
and HANO’s “history of mismanagement, neglect, gentrification and displacement in New Orleans” (Graham,
2012, p. 6),12 the comparative lack of rights and voice for
the poorest, displaced New Orleanians and the relative lack
of storm damage to the brick projects compared to the
private rental housing market, the struggle over public
housing grew into an outsized, symbolic battleground over
the rights of the poor in the new New Orleans, their rights
to the city, to housing, to participation in the recovery
process, and to their bodily and community autonomy.
Indeed, the conflict over public housing in New Orleans
coincided with the growing critique and resistance to
policies of deregulation and privatization that result in
gentrification and displacement in low-income communities nationwide, and with the call for alternative policies
and solutions (see, e.g., Bratt, Stone, & Hartman, 2006;
Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Gotham & Greenberg, 2008;
“Harrisburg Housing Authority,” 2007; Mays, 2007; Peck,
2006; Right to the City Alliance, 2010; Shortt, 2007;
Slater, 2006).
Activists mobilized around preserving public housing,
arguing that it is a barometer for society’s commitment to
safe and affordable housing for everyone, and an indispensable safety net tool for the poor, as one of the few housing
policy arenas still relatively insulated from the vagaries of
the market (Right to the City Alliance, 2010). The struggle
over public housing in New Orleans became linked up in
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the years following Katrina with national and international
movements for the right to cities as diverse, accessible,
integrated, public spaces, and affordable, safe, vibrant
places for all strata of society.
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Coda: Faubourg Lafitte
Lafitte site redevelopment was delayed for several years
after the bottom fell out of the tax credit market during the
recent housing crisis. Today, the new Faubourg Lafitte is
rising on Lafitte’s former footprint, supplemented by a mix
of scattered site housing around Tremé to integrate the site
into the community (see Figures 2 and 3).
Providence/Enterprise brought virtually everything to
the redevelopment that housing advocates call for in public
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housing revitalization: one-for-one replacement with a
physical unit; resident participation in site planning and
tenant leadership for the new site; wrap-around supportive
services for returning and neighboring residents; reliance
on local organizations for organizing and social service
provision; integration of the site plan into the overall built
environment of the neighborhood; and deep expertise in
housing finance, public housing revitalization, and delivery
of social services in a culturally sensitive manner.
Yet, this model redevelopment was extremely contentious and hard won in the aftermath of Katrina. It unfolded within historically, institutionally, and contextually
rooted resistance to public housing transformation, radiating outward from New Orleans via nationwide advocacy
networks and embodied in protest, litigation, and even
sustained legislative advocacy aimed at stopping or at least

Figure 2. Lafitte demolition, in the spring of 2008, Tremé, New Orleans.
Source: Karen Apricot, by permission.
(Color figure available online.)

RJPA_A_738143.indd 475

11/26/12 8:15:50 AM

Downloaded by [John Jay College of Criminal Justice], [Leigh Graham] at 13:20 12 December 2012

476 Journal of the American Planning Association, Autumn 2012, Vol. 78, No. 4

Figure 3. Faubourg Lafitte.
Source: Editor B, http:b.rox.com/, by permission.
(Color figure available online.)

slowing down HUD and HANO. The rhetoric of the
recovery network profiled here, that of stepping in as a
quasi-government, of confronting the exposed inequities of
global capitalism and the South’s apartheid economy, of
building a movement for the most important period of
urban restoration since Reconstruction, all suggested
grander recovery ambitions than site revitalization plans
and litigation. Of course, in the moments and months
after disasters, rhetoric is fiery, aspirations are bold, and
solidarity is in rich supply. Furthermore, GOP control of
the White House and both houses of Congress when
Katrina struck suggested strenuous obstacles to any liberal
or progressive redevelopment plans.
But implicit in the deeper critiques of Katrina’s exposure of decades of anti-urban bias, institutional inequality
and racial and economic injustice was an admission that
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past urban revitalization strategies had been insufficient.
Sure, New Orleans would benefit from even basic investments in housing, jobs, and education, but what it really
demanded was new models of human, physical, and community development. Beginning with mobilization across
the Katrina diaspora, combined with strong local representation and underwritten by substantial resources from
national supporters and advisers, this diverse coalition of
organizations believed they had the knowledge, connections, and resources to finally bring such an integrated
vision of organized community control and redevelopment
leadership to bear in this historic moment.
Unfortunately, the coalition operated within a hostile
and chaotic post-flood political environment in which local
and national social justice activists believed that Katrina
had given cover to policymakers and their private-sector
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Many thanks to Jeanette Estima for her editorial assistance and the
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on this article. I
would especially like to thank Steven Moga and Joseph Heathcott for
their thoughtful and encouraging feedback on this analysis. Last, special
thanks to the activists and practitioners committed to the equitable
recovery of New Orleans.

3. The mean asset base was $1.36 billion for the Northeast organizations, due in part to the enormous endowments of two national foundations. It was $27 million for New Orleans-based organizations. The
range across the entire 28 organizations is from a negative net worth of
$2 million to over $11 billion in assets.
4. For instance, activists from Community Labor United (CLU) in New
Orleans reached out to faculty allies in the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) for recovery resources and support. CLU would go on to become
the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee (PHRF),
and sought technical and strategic assistance in the first weeks after the
flood around building a political response to what was quickly being
framed as a manmade disaster resulting from government failure and
neglect (e.g., Thomas, 2005).
5. Please see Wellman (1983), Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi (2010),
Diani (2003), and Klandersman and Oegema (1987) for network
definitions. Please see Ferguson and Stoutland (1999) for a similar
analysis of the community development system.
6. Personal communications are gleaned from my field notes as a
practitioner and scholar in post-Katrina New Orleans, including
communications such as meeting notes, e-mails, records of conversations, etc. Occasionally, and regrettably, these materials were not dated.
7. MIT Professor of Architecture John Fernandez provided expert
witness testimony in Anderson v. Jackson (2006) about the sound
structural condition of the Big Four.
8. At the time of this exchange, a scholar’s petition titled “Moving to
Opportunity in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina” (Briggs et al., 2005)
was circulating online. It best embodies the appetite for deconcentration
strategies, though it did not call explicitly for public housing demolition. Also see The Brookings Institution (2005).
9. The Enterprise Social Investment Fund has been a frequent private
development partner in HOPE VI nationwide.
10. In total, HUD housed about 14,000 families prior to Katrina, with
5,100 in public housing and 9,000 using vouchers, a population of 49,000
people that was more than 10% of the city’s population (Filosa, 2006).
11. The state devoted the vast majority of its Community Development
Block Grant redevelopment funds ($10.4 billion) to making homeowners whole to rebuild their properties, allocating only about $1 billion to
rental properties, especially $852 million to small rental property
owners, reflecting the relative lack of large, multifamily properties in the
city. An additional $1.7 billion in low-income housing tax credits was
set aside for large, mixed-income developments (Public meeting at the
Louisiana Supreme Court in New Orleans, LA, July 11, 2006).
12. Activists working with displaced public housing residents postKatrina estimate that “half of the working poor, elderly and disabled
who lived in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina have not returned.
Because of critical shortages in low-cost housing, few now expect tens of
thousands of poor and working people to ever be able to return home”
(Evans, 2008).

Notes
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allies to remove a significant portion of the city’s undesirable, seemingly intractable, pre-storm features utilized
mainly by the working and very poor, that is, its failing
public school system, its hulking public hospital, and its
public housing projects (see, e.g., Arena, 2007; Graham,
2006b). Furthermore, available for recovery were an
abundance of tax credits and large tracts of publicly owned
land formerly sheltering the poorest New Orleanians.
Organizational actors with housing and real estate expertise
were uniquely advantaged in this landscape, and they
struggled to put their financial and political resources to
equitable use for displaced New Orleanians. As one advocate suggested,
…Low-income, marginalized, dispersed populations
need organized, active, persistent representation so
they don’t get left out of this…those of us who can
accumulate large parcels of land in certain neighborhoods, for large-scale redevelopment efforts, need to
incorporate community organizing into planning and
redevelopment to drive reconstruction…” (Graham,
2006a; italics in original)
At the aforementioned planning meeting in Tremé, an
elderly African American resident and public housing
activist accused the planners of leading a process that
would end up “just like St. Thomas,” where “those people
are totally gone” (personal communication, n.d.). Visions
of demonstration blocks hosting new models of equitable
development gave way to a public housing revitalization
contract and class-action lawsuit, as the coalition’s bold
plans for a transformed Tremé and New Orleans narrowed
and clouded in the face of HUD’s determination to unbuild its own pioneering housing legacy in New Orleans.
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Appendix

Figure A-1. Neighborhoods in Orleans Parish. On the map, Tremé/Lafitte is upriver from the French Quarter and downriver from City Park and Bayou
St. John.
Source: Reproduced by permission of Greater New Orleans Community Data Center.
(Color figure available online.)
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